Hidden intelligence breakdowns behind Mumbai 26/11 attacks: Report

WashingtonCiting what it called hidden intelligence breakdowns behind the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks a new investigative report has described Mumbai as a tragic case study in the strengths and limitations of hightech surveillanceAn analysis of documents leaked by Edward Snowden contradicted the US governments claims that the National Security Agency had played a key role in preventing a followup plot against a Danish newspaper in 2009 says the report by Sebastian RotellaRotella who writes for investigative news site ProPublica has extensively reported about key PakistaniAmerican plotter David Coleman Headley whose reconnaissance for Pakistani spymasters and terrorist chiefs was crucial to the 2008 terrorist attacksIn a series of stories and in the 2011 Frontline documentary A Perfect Terrorist ProPublica had detailed multiple breakdowns in the US counterterror system that allowed Headley to elude detection for years despite tips that could have prevented the attacks he saidAmerican Terrorist a major update of the 2011 Frontline film airing in the US Tuesday night details the story of Headleys eventual capture as well as the secret surveillance of Mumbai plotters that took place before and during the attacksThe Snowden documents show that months before Mumbai British intelligence began spying on the online communications of Zarrar Shah a key plotter who was the technology chief for the Pakistani terror group LashkareTaiba Rotella wroteBritains General Communications Headquarters GCHQ had the ability to monitor many of Shahs digital activities including web searches and emails during weeks in which he did research on targets handled reconnaissance data and set up an internet phone system for the attackBut based on documents and interviews it appears that the British spy agency did not use its access to closely analyse data from Shah until a Lashkar attack squad invaded Mumbai on November 26 2008Nor did the British tell the Americans they were watching Shah beforehand despite the close alliance between GCHQ and the NSA he wroteThe British data could have complemented separate chatter that the NSA and CIA were collecting about a potential attack on Mumbai none of it related to Headley Rotella wroteMeanwhile Indian intelligence had separately tracked Shahs communications before the attack he wroteOnce the shooting started the spy agencies went into high gear the report addedThe British realised that prior targeting of Shah gave them realtime access to the Karachi control room from which Lashkar chiefs directed the threeday siege using phones and computersGCHQ and NSA pulled a haul of intelligence from the monitoring of Shah and others that enabled analysts to assemble a complete operations plan of the plot according to an NSA document cited by ProPublicaThe evidence helped the Western and Indian governments push Pakistan to crack down on LashkarUS officials the report said emphasised that they had warned the IndiansBritish officials disputed the idea that they had information that could have prevented an attack They said they would have shared such intelligence with India it said